The Engineering Equipment and Materials User Association (EEMUA) recently published recommendations for average and peak alarm rates of 1 alarm per 10 minutes during normal operations and no more than 10 alarms per 10 minutes following an upset condition, respectively. However, these recommendations have been made in the absence of human performance studies or theory. This paper presents two studies -an analytical Keystroke-Level Modeling study and a Markov modeling study-that provide an initial human performance context for the EEMUA recommendations. Results suggest that these EEMUA recommendations are in line with human performance limits. Several limitations of the two studies for generalizing from either the KLM or Markov modeling results are discussed. Practical implications presented include the need for advanced alarm reduction techniques and consideration of peak alarm rates for upset conditions during the alarm rationalization process. Future research directions are also discussed, such as establishing the duration for which the EEMUA recommendation for peak alarm rates can be endured by a human operator.
INTRODUCTION
The Engineering Equipment and Materials Users Association (EEMUA) recently published a guideline document on alarm management practices for the refining and petrochemicals industries (EEMUA, 1999) . In this document, EEMUA advocates alarm rates of 1 alarm per 10 minute period during normal operations and no more than 10 alarms in the first 10 minutes of an upset (op cit., p. 105 and 107, respectively). EEMUA states that these values were based on surveying industrial manufacturing sites, rather than on "fundamental theory" (op cit., p. 37). Bransby and Jenkinson (1998) performed that industrial survey and included an extensive literature survey on various aspects of alarm system. Very little literature was identified that would support the recommendations above, which Bransby and Jenkinson (1998, p. 19) admit are based on their "professional experience".
The human factors literature is not devoid of work on alarms in process control (cf., Edworthy, J., Stanton, N., & Hellier, 1995; O'Hara, Brown, Higgins, & Stubler, 1994; Stanton, 1994) . However, the bulk of this work focuses on the design and implementation of visual and auditory alarms and does not specifically address appropriate alarm rates that are compatible with human cognitive abilities. Despite this fact, there are several studies that investigated time-related performance associated with reading alarm messages. Hollywell and Marshall (1994) reported that the maximum rate at which participants could read alarm messages was 30 messages per minute, with performance degradation manifesting as missed messages, not as accuracy or response time, and that the subjective preference by participants was 15 messages per minute. This latter rate of 15 messages per minute is corroborated by extrapolating from the empirical results of Danchak (1988, figure 3 ).
To their credit, Hollywell and Marshall (1994) do point out that these findings are based on "highly idealized representations of the operator's task" and point to factors that might increase and decrease the rates reported. One such factor that might result in a lower alarm rate (e.g., fewer alarms per unit time, not more) would include taking a control action to rectify the process condition that gave rise to the alarm, part and parcel to having an alarm annunciated (EEMUA, 1999). We were not able to find studies in public domain that contained more representative experimental tasks in which participants had to determine the appropriate course of action in response to an alarm, execute that response, and confirm that the response was successful in eliminating the alarm condition.
The research reported here consists of two studies focused on answering the question "what would be a reasonable alarm rate, as predicted by human performance limitations, for response tasks representative of the (refining and petrochemicals plant) operator?"
METHOD
The first study for answering the question of an acceptable alarm rate based on human performance limitations was to create an analytical human activity model for alarm response. The modeling technique applied was derived from the Keystroke-Level Model (KLM: Kieras, 2001 ), based on the GOMS work of Card, Moran, and Newell (1983) . The second approach to answering this same question was to apply Markov analysis (Kemeny & Snell, 1976 ) to recorded observations of process control operators and calculate a probabilistic estimate of alarms handled per unit time.
Study 1: The KLM Approach
An analytical model of human activity for alarm response was generated by first decomposing a prototypical response to an alarm into subsequent sub-goals of "assess condition", "determine action", "execute action" and "determine effect" (cf., Stanton, Booth, & Stammers, 1992) . The decomposition continued, breaking down each sub-goal into subsequent actions, and those actions into the primitive operators to which psychological-based time constants could be assigned (see Figure 1 , next page). The decomposition from sub-goals to sub-task to operators was based on enacting required actions of a prototypical alarm response on a Honeywell TDC3000 distributed control system at our facility. Several modeling assumptions were made to "qualify" this prototypical alarm response. A sample list of the assumptions, with a qualitative assessment indicated for the validity of each assumption, is presented in Table 1 .
Strong
The operator responds immediately to an incoming alarm.
Prior to alarm coming in, the operator is NOT looking directly at the Alarm Summary display.
Moderate
Prior to alarm coming in, the operator is attentively engaged and monitoring the TDC.
Weak
Alarms are independent, each requiring specific actions to resolve. Strong Alarm priority is indicated redundantly through both color and auditory coding.
Moderate
Alarms are displayed in chronological order (as opposed to alarm priority).
Strong
The Alarm Summary display is continuously present on a dedicated screen.
Moderate
The operator using the TDC 3000 is an expert who is trained and capable of error-free recall of required actions for a given alarm.
Qualitative Validity Assumption
Strong The operator responds immediately to an incoming alarm.
Strong
Moderate
Weak
Moderate
Strong
Moderate
The operator using the TDC 3000 is an expert who is trained and capable of error-free recall of required actions for a given alarm. Additional modeling assumptions had to be made about the "configurable" parameters needed for estimating response times with the KLM. The KLM model was implemented as in an MS Excel spreadsheet such that manipulating any of the following would result in a new time estimate. A sample list of configurable parameters, and assumptions about their values, is presented in Table 2 .
Qualitative Validity Assumption
The spreadsheet was then used to generate a profile of response times as a function of simultaneously occurring alarms (from 1 to 30) in order to validate the EEMUA recommendation of no more than 10 alarms per 10 minute period following an upset. This profile is presented in the Results section. 
Study 2: The Markov Modeling Approach
A probabilistic estimate of unit time needed per alarm for alarm response was calculated with a Markov transition matrix model. The transition probabilities in the Markov matrix were generated by:
• First, petrochemical operators were videotaped responding to alarm conditions as part of their annual simulator training program. Five professional operators participated in their annual refresher training on a highfidelity simulator of their specific process unit (3 units in total). The training sessions were comprised of 4-5 alarm scenarios, the complexity of which were comparable across units and ranged from a valve failing open to a turbine trip. The entire set of scenarios for each operator lasted approximately 1 hour, with individual scenarios ranging from 4 to 23 minutes. Radio communications between console and field were simulated with the unit trainer acting as the field operator. The alarm management sophistication for the three units ranged from very sophisticated to average. • Second, the operator behavior captured on the video tapes for each alarm scenario from all five operator training sessions were coded according to the coding scheme in Table 3 , and a time-stamped event log was produced for each alarm scenario for each operator.
• Third, the transition probabilities (based on transition counts) for each behavior code pairing and dwell times for each pairing were calculated from the time-stamped event logs. The average transition probabilities and average state dwell times were then calculated across all operators and scenarios.
RESULTS

Study 1: The KLM Approach
Three of the primary results from the KLM, based on the assumptions made, are presented here. First, the KLM indicates that a single alarm occurring by itself would require approximately 3 minutes 22 seconds (see Figure 2) . Second, the KLM indicates that a burst of 10 simultaneous alarms would require approximately 34 minutes 4 seconds, a burst of 20 simultaneous alarms would require approximately 88 minutes 13 seconds, and a burst of 30 simultaneous alarms would require more than 2.5 hours (see Figure 2) . Third, the most significant contributor of this overall time to respond to the alarms, particularly as the number of simultaneous alarms increase, is the time needed to assess the alarms. The time to confirm that an action taken did rectify the alarm condition was the next most significant contributor to the overall time needed to respond to the alarms.
Study 2: The Markov Modeling Approach
The probabilistic estimate of unit time needed for alarm response per alarm was calculated from summing the multiplicative of the average state dwell time for each behavior code (i.e., state) and the average state probability (i.e., the sum of transition probabilities for a given behavior code). The result equaled 49.1 seconds per alarm. This means that the operators observed handled, on average, one alarm approximately every 49 seconds.
DISCUSSION
The results of the two studies combined suggest that refining and petrochemical sites should strive to reach EEMUA recommendations for both average and peak alarm rates. The KLM results indicate -tempered by the assumptions stated above -that operators will require hours to deal with just the initial alarm burst (peak alarm rate) of a process upset or incident. Moreover, the 49 seconds required per alarm as estimated from the Markov Modeling approach would support the EEMUA recommendation that there should be no more than 10 alarms in a 10 minute period following a process upset. Based on the KLM results of Figure 2 , which indicate that Goal 1 (Assessing Notification(s)), design solutions that aide the console operator in more effectively assessing the actual initiating alarm (or the underlying event of a set of alarms) would most significantly drive down the time required to respond to the alarm burst.
Several cautions or qualifications for interpreting the Markov modeling results need to be identified. Specifically, the probabilistic time estimate of 49 second per alarm might best be considered a 'maximum' rate (or performance ceiling). Some of the reasons for this are:
• The trainer approximated the communications between field and console. Anecdotal sharing suggests that the times were shorter in the simulator training than they would be in practice.
• Operator performance on a poorly rationalized alarm system (e.g., when multiple, redundant alarms for a single event occur together) would likely require more than 49 seconds, on average, for response and handling.
• This study did not establish the duration (e.g., 10 minutes, 10 hours, 10 days) that an operator could maintain the pace of one alarm every 49 seconds. One might conjecture that as the duration increases, the time required to deal with each individual alarm might also increase, due to fatigue effects. Similarly, cautions or qualifications for interpreting the KLM results need to be identified as well. Specifically, the KLM does not appear to reflect the observed behavior from the Markov Modeling effort as we had expected it might. That is, the time estimates from the KLM appear to be inflated, specifying more time per alarm in principle than observed. Some potential reasons for this inflation of time include: • The KLM model has an implicit assumption that operators immediately engage in knowledge-based behavior (Rasmussen, 1986) . In fact, the operators are trained to first stabilize the plant conditions and then determine the cause of the process excursion. The KLM model was not explicitly designed to account for rulebased or skill-based behavior. • The KLM model does not explicitly account for expectation of sets of alarms (cf., Kragt & Bonten, 1983) . Rather, the KLM analyzes each alarm as independent entities, rather than as a member of a set of alarms that are "new, and unexpected", or "new, but expected". Arguably, to the extent to which "pattern recognition" for expected alarm sets occurred in the Markov modeling scenarios, the Markov results would account for such behavior. This argument has not been validated however. • The KLM model does not account for parallel activity, as observed in the Markov Modeling efforts (e.g., calling up new displays to look for dis/confirming evidence while waiting for a reply over the radio from the field operator).
CONCLUSIONS Practical Implications
As stated above, the results of the two studies combined suggest that refining and petrochemical sites should strive to reach EEMUA recommendations for average alarm rate, and in particular for peak alarm rates. In addition to the current industrial practices of alarm rationalization (Mostia, 2003) in configuring the alarm system, the use of sophisticated techniques such as alarm filtering or dynamic (modal) alarming (O'Hara et al, 1994 ) could be applied-thereby aiding the operator in assessing the notification (i.e., Goal 1 of the KLM model). Perhaps most significantly, to achieve peak alarm rate targets, here is a need to (1) consider upset conditions as part of the alarm rationalization processes, asking how a given point will contribute to either the understanding of the upset or to the alarm flood that might be associated with the event, and (2) analyze alarm system performance as part of incident investigations when incidents or accidents do occur to determine if alarm configuration improvements are needed (Errington, DeMaere, & Reising, 2004) .
Future Research
One outstanding effort for the current project is to improve the validity of the KLM and its predictive worth by relating the observed behavioral sequences coded from the video tapes for the Markov analysis back to the analytical KLM elements. We are currently investigating to what extent sequential analysis techniques (Bakeman & Gottman, 1997) can be applied to relating the observed behavior sequences to those in the KLM.
Other future work related to human response to alarm notifications includes:
• Conducting a more comprehensive observational study, across both the refining and petrochemicals industries, involving multiple companies, etc. to offset potential idiosyncrasies that might arise due to an individual sites training program, user interface design approach, alarm system sophistication, and so on.
• Establishing a duration for which a peak alarm rate of 10 alarms per 10 minute period remains acceptable.
